In this paper, we take a stochastic approach to modelling psychological experience including age changes in number of memorable events, attentional explanations, forward telescoping, difficulty of recall, and time pressure. We then determine whether subjective acceleration of time is a mathematical consequence from the models.
Introduction
In the literature of psychology, the illusion to people that time appears to pass more rapidly when they are old than when they are young has long been studied, see for example, [1] and [2] . Psychologists refer this to the subjective acceleration of time. In this paper, we survey the main theories explaining this phenomenon and develop stochastic models to analyze whether subjective acceleration of time is a mathematical consequence from the models.
Theories in the literature
Friedman and Janssen summarize the theories explaining the subjective acceleration of time [3] .
1. Age changes in number of memorable events -Fraisse explains the subjective acceleration of time using the assumption that human beings perceive the magnitude of past intervals of time according to how many events can be remembered from that period of time [4] . Since in adulthood events become automatic routines and older people hardly notify them, they think the passage of time is faster than in the childhood when events are fresh and distinct at that time.
2. Ratio theories -Fraisse surveys a suggestion by Janet that the impression of a given interval of time to human beings are based on an implicit comparison of that interval with the amount of time they have lived [5] .
In a more recent study, Lemlich proposes that the subjective duration of an interval of real time varies interval of real time varies inversely with the square-root of the total real time (age) [6] .
3. Biological clock theories -Draaisma, among others, proposes that the slowing down of the internal pacemaker of the human beings will render them to perceive that time appear to pass more quickly [7] .
4. Attentional explanations -Gruber et al., among others, suggests that the decline in attentional resources explains the subjective acceleration of time [8] . Aging will result in decline in attentional resources and therefore older people have less attention to pay to the notification of the passage of time and perceive that time passes faster.
Friedman and Janssen also summarize three main explanation as to why people feel that time is passing quickly, regardless of the difference in the age [3] .
1. Forward telescoping -People tend to underestimate how long ago some particular events occurred. When it happens, people get the impression that time have passed quickly. For example, if an event that seems as if it happened one year ago but turns out to be happened four years ago, one might feel that four years have passed unexpectedly quickly.
2. Difficulty of recall -People tend to judge the length of the interval of time using the number of events that can be recalled as a proxy. The difficulty of recalling such events render people to believe that time has passed quickly.
3. Time pressure -The feeling that people cannot accomplish the tasks due to insufficient time are usually reinterpreted as the feeling that time is passing quickly.
Stochastic Models
We construct stochastic models for the psychological experience and determine whether the subjective acceleration of time is a resulting effect from the experience. In particular, we construct stochastic models for age changes in number of memorable events, attentional explanations, forward telescoping, difficulty of recall, and time pressure.
Age changes in number of memorable events
Suppose that the total number of memorable events a person encountered up to time t is denoted by N (t), and {N (t), t ≥ 0} is assumed to be a Poisson process with rate λ. It is a reasonable assumption in that the interarrival times between events being exponential random variables is justifiable. For simplicity, we assume that the person classifies all memorable events into K different classes with probability p k where p k > 0 and
Accordingly, we define {N k (t), t ≥ 0} to be the stochastic process of the total number of memorable events of class k encountered up to time t. When the person encounters the same class of memorable events again, that person will feel routine and therefore hardly recognize them. According to the theory, the feeling of the passage of time of that person is roughly proportional to the number of memorable events that can be recently recalled. Let us consider the following stochastic processes
where (x ∧ y) denotes the minimum of x and y, and 1 {·} is the indicator function. The above random variable counts the number of memorable events over the time interval (t−∆, t) that are encountered for the first time (thus the requirement of multiplying 1 {N k (t−∆t)=0} ) and if those events are encountered more than once, the person will still count the number as one (thus taking the minimum of N k (t) − N k (t − ∆t) and 1). The expectation of M (t) can be found as follows.
By the thinning properties of Poisson processes, {N k (t), t ≥ 0} are independent Poisson processes with rate λp k . Also by the independent increment of Poisson
It is easy to see that E[M (t)] is a decreasing function of t. Therefore, as the person gets older (t increases), the expected number of memorable events that are encountered for the first time will decrease. As a result, on average, a person will feel the passage of time faster under the assumption that the magnitude of past intervals of time is judged according to how many events can be remembered from that period of time.
Attentional explanations
We use a queueing system framework for modelling attention. The attention paid by a person is analogous to a service given to a customer in a queueing system while the tasks to be handled by that person is analogous to a customer coming from and leaving the queueing system. For the simplicity of the analysis, I further assume that the capacity of queueing system is 1, and tasks arrive with mean time of . In particular, this is a birth and death process with λ 0 = λ and λ i = 0 for i > 0 and µ 0 = µ and µ i = 0 for i > 0, where state 1 indicates that the person is paying attention to a task and state 0 indicates that the person is not paying attention to any task and thus can have the time to notice the passage of time. According to this theory, if the person has less time to notice the passage of time, that person will feel that time passes faster.
Let P ij (t) denote the transition probability moving from state i to state j in time t. The Kolmogorov's backward equation for this particular system can be written as P 00 (t) = λ(P 10 (t) − P 00 (t)), P 10 (t) = λ(P 00 (t) − P 10 (t)).
Eliminating P 10 (t) and P 00 (t) to obtain µP 00 (t) + λP 10 (t) = 0, µP 00 (t) + λP 10 (t) = c, for some constant c. Since P 00 (0) = 1 and P 10 (0) = 0, c = µ and therefore
substituting this result into the system of the ODE, we obtain the following ODE P 00 (t) = µ − (µ + λ)P 00 (t).
Using the integrating factor of e (µ+λ)t , (P 00 (t)e (µ+λ)t ) = µe
for some constant C. Since P 00 (0) = 1, C = λ µ+λ . Finally,
Suppose the person initially has probability of p being in state 0 (i.e., 1 − p being in state 1), the probability of that person not paying attention to any task in time t, denoted by P (t), is given by 
The initial state of the person can be assumed to be a new born baby and it is reasonable to set p = 1. Therefore, the expectation is a decreasing function of time t. In other words, the person will have less attention to notify the passage of time as time goes by (the person gets older) and subjective acceleration of time is then predicted.
Forward telescoping
We assume that a person encounters events according to a Poisson process {N (t), t ≥ 0} with rate λ. We further suppose that the person independently estimates how long ago any particular event occurred at any time t with a probability p (the probability is time independent) of underestimation. Under this theory, if underestimation occurs, that person will experience subjective acceleration of time. By the thinning property of the Poisson process, the number of events that the person underestimates how long ago they occurred, denoted by N 1 (t), is itself a Poisson process with rate pλ. The probability that the person experiences any underestimation at time t is given by
If the person has non-zero probability of underestimation of event happening time, the probability is an increasing function of t. It illustrates that when the person gets older, that person will have higher probability of experiencing the time underestimation of any event. Under this theory, the time dependent underestimation of the exact happening time of past events will result in subjective acceleration of time.
Difficulty of recall
We again assume that {N (t), t ≥ 0} is a Poisson process with rate λ counting the number of events a person has encountered up to time t. Since it is more difficult to recall events further in the past, the person is assumed to be able to recall the n events independently and with probability e µ(s−t) if the particular event has occurred at time s < t given that the person has encountered n events up to time t, where µ > 0. Let N 1 (t) denote the number of events that can be recalled up to time t by that person. The expected number of recallable events in an interval of time (t − ∆t, t) is computed as follows.
which can be further simplify as exp(
). Note that this expression is independent of time, and therefore it is consistent to the psychology literature that the difficulty of recall theory does not imply the subjective acceleration of time.
Time pressure
Under this theory, the feeling that people cannot accomplish the tasks due to insufficient time are usually reinterpreted as the feeling that time is passing quickly as it is. We construct a queueing system to model such a feeling. We choose an M/M/1 model where tasks arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ while the person finishes the tasks with the time following exponential distribution with rate µ. The feeling that the person cannot accomplish the tasks can be referred to that the person is in state i where i > 0. Since as long as the person is busy with something, that person will feel there is insufficient time. While the steady state behavior of the M/M/1 queue is well-known, it is not appropriate here to look at the steady state behavior as the difference of the characteristics of the queue over time is crucial to determine whether the subjective acceleration of time can be implied from this theory. To this end, we analyze the relationship between the time pressure theory and the concept of the subjective acceleration of time via the transient state properties of the M/M/1 queue. In particular, the probability P 00 (t) can shed light on whether the people would feel busy more likely when they get older.
The solution of P 00 (t) solved from the Kolmogorov's equation is generally not trivial. However, Abate and Whitt discussed a methodology based on the Laplace Transform to give the following expression [9] . P 00 (t) = 1 − λ µ P (T 10 ≤ t) ,
where T 10 is the first-passage time from state 1 to state 0. Since P 00 (t) is a decreasing function of t, people are less likely in state 0 as they get older. Therefore, the subjective acceleration of time can be implied from this theory.
